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Abstract. Vulnerable software represents a tremendous threat to mod-
ern information systems. Vulnerabilities in widespread applications may
be used to spread malware, steal money and conduct target attacks. To
address this problem, developers and researchers use different approaches
of dynamic and static software analysis; one of these approaches is called
fuzzing. Fuzzing is performed by generating and sending potentially mal-
formed data to an application under test. Since first appearance in 1988,
fuzzing has evolved a lot, but issues which addressed to effectiveness
evaluation have not fully investigated until now.
In our research, we propose a novel approach of fuzzing effectiveness eval-
uation and improving, taking into account semantics of executed code
along with a quantitative assessment. For this purpose, we use specific
metrics of source code complexity assessment specially adapted to per-
form analysis of machine code. We conducted effectiveness evaluation of
these metrics on 104 wide-spread applications with known vulnerabili-
ties. As a result of these experiments, we were able to identify the best
metrics that is more suitable to find bugs. In addition we proposed a
set of open-source tools for improving fuzzing effectiveness. The exper-
imental results of effectiveness assessment have shown viability of our
approach and allowed to reduce time costs for fuzzing campaign by an
average of 26-28% for 5 well-known fuzzing systems.
Keywords: fuzzing, metrics, complexity, code coverage, machine code
1 Introduction
Nowadays each software product should meet a number of conditions and re-
quirements to be useful and successful on the market. Despite this fact, software
engineers and developers keep making mistakes (bugs) during software devel-
opment. In turn, these bugs can create favorable conditions for emergence of
serious vulnerabilities. This is particularly relevant for network applications be-
cause vulnerabilities in this type of software create great opportunities for an
attacker, such as remote code execution or DoS attack. However, practice has
shown that vulnerabilities in local applications may also present a serious threat
to information systems if they allow to execute arbitrary code in the context of
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2 Improving fuzzing using software complexity metrics
vulnerable application. This severely endangers commercial success of the prod-
uct and can considerably decrease the security rate of infrastructure as well.
Critical vulnerabilities in widespread products deserve special attention because
they are often a target for mass malware attacks and persistent threats. Suffice
it to say that in 2014, US National Vulnerability Database registered 26 new
vulnerabilities per day on average [1].
There are two fundamentally different approaches for bugs detection in binary
executables: static and dynamic analysis. Static analysis is aimed at finding
bugs in applications without execution, while dynamic analysis performs bugs
detection at runtime.
In our research, we consider only binary code of the program. Binary code
(machine code, executable code) is a code (a set of instructions) executed directly
by a CPU. The reason of this is due to the presence of proprietary software that is
distributed in binary form only. The second problem related to transformations
performed by compilers and optimizer tools that may significantly change actual
behavior of the program in the binary form. This problem is called What You
See Is Not What You eXecute [2].
In the paper, we will use technique of dynamic analysis called fuzzing. Fuzzing
is performed by generating and sending potentially malformed data to an ap-
plication. The first appearance of fuzzing in software testing dates back to 1988
by Professor Barton Miller [7]; since then the fuzzing has evolved a lot and it
is now used for vulnerabilities detection and bugs finding in a large number of
different applications. There are a lot of instruments for fuzzing, such as Sulley
[3], Peach [4], SAGE [5] and many others. However, issues which addressed to
effectiveness evaluation have not fully investigated until now.
Today researchers often use several basic criteria for effectiveness evaluation:
the number of errors found, the number of executed instructions, basic blocks
or syscalls as well as cyclomatic complexity or attack surface exposure [6]–[9].
During the last several decades, the theory of software reliability has pro-
posed a wide range of different metrics to assess source code complexity and the
probability of errors. The general idea of this assessment is that more complex
code has more bugs. In this paper, our hypothesis is that source code complexity
assessment metrics could be adapted to use them for binary code analysis. Thus
it would allow to perform analysis based on semantics of executed instructions
as well as their interaction with input data.
We will provide an overview of technique, architecture, implementation, and
effectiveness evaluation of our approach. We will carry out separate tests to com-
pare effectiveness of 25 complexity metrics on 104 wide-spread applications with
known vulnerabilities. Moreover, we will perform assessment of our approach to
reduce time costs of fuzzing campaigns for 5 different well-known fuzzers.
The purpose of this research was to increase effectiveness of the fuzzing tech-
nique in general, regardless of the specific solutions. Thus, we did not develop
our own fuzzer, but focused on flexibility of our tools by making them easy to
use with any fuzzers. Thus we did not try to improve test cases generation or
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mutation to find more bugs but we try to make fuzzing campaign more efficient
in terms of time costs required to detect bugs in software.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
1. We adapted a set of source code complexity metrics to perform fuzzing ef-
fectiveness evaluation by estimating complexity of executable code.
2. We conducted the comparative experimental evaluation of proposed metrics
and identified the most appropriate ones to detect bugs in executable code.
3. We implemented a set of tools for executable code complexity evaluation
and executable trace analysis. In addition, we also made our tools and ex-
perimental results accessible for everyone in support of open science [28].
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we illustrate short overview of
fuzzing and problems of its effectiveness evaluation. Section 3 covers details of
metrics adaptation. Then, Section 4 provides an in-depth description of system
implementation. Detailed results of metrics effectiveness evaluation and their
comparison are presented in Section 5. Section 6 used to present experimental
results of system integration with well-known fuzzers. Further, we outline related
works in Section 7 and describe the direction of our future research in Section
8. Finally, we use Section 9 to present conclusions.
2 Problem Statement
In Section 1, we mentioned that fuzzing is performed by generating and send-
ing potentially malformed data to an application. Nowadays, fuzzing is used
for testing different types of input interfaces such as: network protocols [10],
file formats [11], in-memory fuzzing [12], drivers and many others software and
hardware products that process input data. Moreover, fuzzing is not limited to
pseudorandom data generation or mutation, but includes a mature formal data
description protocol and low-level analysis of binary code for generating data
and monitoring results. However, the question still remains: How can we eval-
uate fuzzing effectiveness? Of course, we can assess it by the number of bugs
detected in an application. But this is not a flexible approach, since it does not
provide any information on how well the testing data was generated or mutated
in case when the analysis showed no errors at all. On the other hand, for this
purpose, we can use code coverage, assuming that the higher is code coverage,
the more effective the testing. Code coverage is a measure used to describe the
degree to which the code of a program is tested by a particular test suite. In
most cases, researchers assess code coverage by calculating the total number of
instructions, basic blocks or routines that have been executed in the application
under test. However, they do not take into account the complexity of tested
code. For example, different code paths may have equal values of code coverage
but their complexity may be different. Let us consider the example in Figure 1.
The code in Listing A handles user data and may contain buffer overflow,
whereas the code in Listing B reads an integer and performs some calculations
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Listing A
push eax
push 0Ah
lea eax , [ebp+Source]
push eax
call fgets
add esp , 0Ch
lea eax , [ebp+Source]
push eax
lea ecx , [ebp+Format]
push ecx
call strcpy
add esp , 8
cmp [ebp+var_34], 0
jnz short loc_4135B6
Listing B
push eax
push offset Format
call scanf
add esp , 8
mov eax , [ebp+b]
imul eax , 6
add eax , 3
mov ecx , [ebp+b]
imul ecx , 6
add ecx , 3
imul eax , ecx
add eax , [ebp+a]
mov [ebp+a], eax
jnz short loc_4135AD
Fig. 1. Two different code blocks with equal code coverage measure
by using this value. Code coverage for these examples is the same, but the code
in Listing A is more interesting for analysis.
Basili V. [13], Khoshgoftaar M. [14], Olague H. [15] and other researchers
have shown that in general, increasing of code complexity leads to increase in
the probability of an error. This contention is supported by experimental results
[6]–[9].
In this paper, we propose to adapt source code complexity assessment metrics
so as to take into account semantics of binary code. We propose the following
hypothesis: ”There is a more effective complexity metric for fuzzing effectiveness
assessment than the number of executed instructions, basic blocks and routines,
as well as than cyclomatic complexity”. Thus, we need to adapt complexity met-
rics for binary code and then perform analysis of their effectiveness in comparison
with traditional metrics.
In our research, we consider the following types of errors: buffer and heap
overflows, format string errors, read and write to invalid or incorrect memory
address, null pointer dereferences, use after free, as well as use of uninitialized
memory.
3 Metrics adaptation
In the article, we adapted 25 metrics of source code complexity assessment.
Without getting into description of each metric, let us describe symbols and
references to the authors of each measure.
– Lines of code count (LOC ), basic blocks count (BBLs), procedure calls count
(CALLS);
– Jilb metric (Jilb) [16], ABC metric (ABC ), Cyclomatic complexity (CC )
[17], Modified cyclomatic complexity (CC mod)[16], density of CFG (R) [18],
Pivovarsky metric (Pi) [16], Halstead metrics for code volume (H.V ), length
and calculated length (H.N, H.N∗), difficulty (H.D), effort (H.E ), the num-
ber of delivered bugs (H.B) [19];
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– Harrison and Magel metric (Harr) [20], boundary values metric (Bound),
span metric (Span), Henry and Cafura metric (H&C ) [21], Card and Glass
metric (C&G) [22], Oviedo metric (Oviedo) [23], Chapin metric (Chapin)
[24];
– Cocol metric (Cocol) [16].
The detailed description of each adapted metric is also given in the Appendix
1. Metrics that take into account high level information such as source code
comments, name of variables or some object oriented information were excluded
from the scope of this analysis.
It should be noted that for most of the metrics we need to perform conversion
of routines code into control flow graph (CFG). CFG has only one entry and
one exit. A path in the CFG can be represented as an ordered sequence of
node numbers. In terms of binary code analysis, graph nodes are represented as
a basic block of instructions and edges describe control flow transfer between
basic blocks. Basic block (linear block) is a set of machine instructions without
conditional or unconditional jumps excluding function calls. Algorithm 1 allows
to perform such conversion.
Algorithm 1: Routine to CFG translation
Data: Address of the first instruction, an empty set of links
Result: A set of nodes, A set of edges
while not end of routine do
Read instruction;
if First instruction in the node then
Save instruction address as the first address of the node;
Get links of the instriction;
if Number of links > 0 then
Save instruction address as the last address of the node;
Save edges in a set of edges;
Move the pointer to the next instruction;
The algorithm passes through all basic blocks in the routine. A link is condi-
tional or unconditional jump to some address within routine code. Note that the
link is not considered for call instructions. Each instruction at some address may
have from 0 up to n outgoing links. Unconditional jump always has two links,
the first one refers to the address of unconditional jump, and the second one is
the link to the address following immediately after jump instruction. Thus each
node is associated with the following information: address of the head, address
of the end, edge address 1 (optional) and edge address 2 (optional).
Note that bugs may arise from the use of unsafe library functions, such as
strcpy, strcat, lstrcat, memcpy and etc. These functions are banned or not
recommended to use, since they may cause overflows in the memory. Efficient
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fuzzing campaign should take into account this fact and firstly cover the rou-
tines that call these functions. In the article, we propose to use the following
experimental measure based on Halstead B metric (rationale for the choice of
this metric is proposed in Section 5):
Exp = H.B ×
n∑
i=1
(vi + 1) (1)
n - a total number of banned or not recommended functions used in the rou-
tine. vi is calculated as the total number of calls of banned or not recommended
functions in the routine, multiplied by the coefficient of the potential danger asso-
ciated with this syscall. This coefficient calculated by using the banned functions
list proposed by Microsoft within their secure development lifecycle concept [25].
In our research, a function can take only two values: 0.5 for dangerous and 1
for banned syscalls. It should be noted that multiplication is used to prioritize
routines that calls unsafe functions.
4 System overview
4.1 Fuzzing strategy
Let’s describe all basic blocks in a program as an ordered set of nodes: CFG =
{node0, node1,...,noden}, where node is a basic block and n - total number of
basic blocks. Let’s define an array of test data as TD = [td0, td1,...,tdν ], ν - an
array size and td - one instance of test data (file, network packet, etc.) to make
one fuzzing iteration. Then code coverage for one test iteration may be written
as:
Cover = [cov0, ..., covν ] (2)
Then, let’s assign weight for each test case and sort them in descending
order of weight. Weights for test cases is assigned using complexity of trace
which is calculated using metrics described above. Further we will send test
cases according with their position in the sorted array.
In the case of adding new test data in TD without associated coverages, new
instances take the highest priority with respect to existing elements, and passed
to the program in random order before existing test cases.
4.2 Trace analysis
As it was noted in the second section, we need to save addresses of instructions,
basic blocks or routines to assess complexity of code that has been executed
during analysis. In this research, we used technique called dynamic binary in-
strumentation to perform code coverage analysis. Dynamic Binary Instrumen-
tation (DBI) is a technique of analyzing the behavior of a binary application
at runtime through the injection of instrumentation code. The main advantage
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of DBI is the ability to perform binary code instrumentation without switching
the processor context, which significantly improves performance. In our research
we use DBI framework called Pin [26]. Pin provides API to create the dynamic
binary analysis tools called PinTools. Pin performs dynamic translation of each
instruction and adds instrumentation code, if it required. Note that dynamic
translator performs code translation without intermediate stages in the same
architectures (IA32 to IA32, ARM to ARM and etc).
4.3 Metrics evaluation module
Let us describe basic scheme of the tool for binary code complexity assessment
in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Scheme of the tool for binary code complexity assessment
At the first stage, we use IDA disassembler to perform preliminary analy-
sis and disassembling of executable module. Then assembler listing and trace is
passed to the module of CFG analysis that sequentially iterates through each
executed basic block in the program. The routine parser performs analysis of in-
terconnections between basic blocks on the basis of which the tool builds graph of
a routine. This graph is used in the module of metrics calculation that performs
analysis and evaluation of each complexity measure for each required metric.
Where necessary, this module also uses the binary code translation to get infor-
mation required for some metrics. For example, the total number of assignments
could be in turn obtained by using high level listing obtained by the translator,
where operations like eax = eax+ 1 may be considered as an assignment.
5 Metrics effectiveness evaluation
In section 2, it was mentioned that we need to perform effectiveness comparison
between adapted and traditional metrics. To meet this challenge, we decided to
8 Improving fuzzing using software complexity metrics
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Fig. 3. Average effectiveness of each metric. Experimental metric demonstrates maxi-
mum effectiveness. Y - percent interval.
use open database with vulnerable applications called exploit-db supported by
Offensive Security [27]. In our experiment, we randomly selected 104 different
vulnerable applications. This is minimum sample size which is required to eval-
uate the effectiveness of all the metrics in the 95% confidence interval within an
error no more than 3%. As a result we randomly selected the following types
of applications: video and audio players; FTP, HTTP, SMTP, IMAP and media
servers; network tools; scientific applications; computer games; auxiliary tools
(downloaders, torrent-clients, development tools and etc.); libraries (converters,
data parsers and etc.); readers (PDF, DJVU, JPEG and etc.); archivers and etc.
For details please visit [28].
Then exploit has been found for each program which allowed to locate vul-
nerable routine in the application. Each application was in turn analyzed by the
tool of code complexity assessment. Complexity of each metric has been obtained
for each routine in each vulnerable application. Then obtained measures were
ranked in descending order. Lastly, we selected ranks of all vulnerable routines
in each application (The results for each application may be found at [28]). Ob-
viously that obtained results do not allow to assess and compare effectiveness
of metrics, since they do not take into account total number of routines in the
application.An effective metric is a metric that takes a maximum complexity
value for vulnerable routines. Thus the following formula was used to solve this
problem:
PR = (1− frang
TF
), (3)
frang - a routine rank and TF - a total number of routines. This expression
enables to answer the following question: How many routines in a program have
metric values less than for a vulnerable routine? This value in percent may
Improving fuzzing using software complexity metrics 9
be obtained for each metric in each application. Now, it’s possible to calculate
average measures for each metric (Figure 3).
According to Figure 3, Jilb, Global and R metrics showed the lowest average
values. Let’s exclude these metrics from further analysis. Also, it makes sense to
exclude H.D, H.V and H.N∗ metrics, since they’re used to calculate H.B and
showed comparable results.
Let us compare metrics using coefficient of variation (Figure 4). Coefficient
of variation is used to show the extent of variability in relation to the mean of
the value.
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Fig. 4. Coefficients of variation for metrics (less is better). Y axis - coefficient of vari-
ation. Cyclomatic complexities, Chapin and Card&Glass demonstrate high level of
variation.
The obtained statistical results have shown that experimental metric exceeds
metrics based on cyclomatic complexity (by 12,31%) the number of basic blocks
(by 11,23%), calls (by 13,62%), LOC (6.88%) and at the same time has the lowest
coefficient of variation 9.4%. Note that the statistical error for the experimental
metric is 2,54% at 95% confidence interval. Thus, all of these data prove that
hypothesis proposed in the section 2 is correct.
In section 3 it was noted that the basis of experimental metric is Halstead
B measure. We use this measure because Halstead B demonstrated the best
effectiveness compared to other known metrics.
6 Experiments
6.1 Code coverage analysis
According to section 5, the system is based on 2 modules: module of metrics
calculation and module of trace analysis. Let’s describe the general scheme of
the system integration with fuzzer in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5. General scheme of the system
The output of the fuzzer is redirected first in the database to perform test
cases prioritization according to fuzzing strategy. Then the system starts fuzzing
and executable code instrumentation. For each test case the system evaluates
new code coverage using obtained trace. Calculated coverages are written in the
database (to use them further) and results are visualized on the screen. It should
be noted that the process of complexity evaluation is performed in parallel with
fuzzing to increase performance of the system. The tools were developed taking
into account support of several platforms, thus making them easy to port across
different operating systems with minimal changes.
6.2 Experiments
For experimental analysis of proposed approach, it was decided to estimate time
costs for fuzzing campaign before and after integration of our system with 5
well-known fuzzers. We randomly selected 14 popular applications with known
bugs from exploit-db, so as to include each type of bug that is considered in the
article (stratification technique was used). Also we added 4 randomly selected
applications (2 for Linux and 2 for Windows) from exploit-db with two and more
bugs in one application to analyze capability of the system reduce time costs for
several bug detections. Each software product was deployed in the private virtual
environments within the following configurations: Windows 7 x64 (Intel Core i7
2.4 GHz with 2 Gb RAM), Windows Server 2008 SP2 x64 (Intel Core i7 2.4 GHz
with 4 Gb RAM), Ubuntu Linux 12.10 (Intel Core i7 2.4 GHz with 4 Gb RAM).
Experimental results presented in Figure 6.
Thus experimental results have shown that proposed system allowed to reduce
time costs for testing by an average of 26-28% for any considered fuzzer. Detailed
results may be found at [29].
7 Related works
There are a lot of researches which performs fuzzing using some knowledge about
testing application (white box fuzzing) to improve future tests generation, such
Improving fuzzing using software complexity metrics 11
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Fig. 6. The total time costs for fuzzing campaigns before and after integration of
proposed system. The ordinate represents the total number of hours spent on testing
all programs. White bar represents fuzzing campaign with proposed system. Zzuf [30],
CERT fuzzer [31]
as: symbolic execution or taint analysis [32]–[35]. Also, in several researches, au-
thors try to use evolution algorithms [6][36][37] for effective data generation and
increasing code coverage. Often, as an indicator of effectiveness is used the fol-
lowing metrics: the number of detected bugs, executed instructions, basic blocks
and dangerous syscalls [6]–[9][37]–[42]. Moreover, authors may apply special cov-
erage criteria such as statements, decisions, and condition coverage [38][39][12].
In other case, researchers use input-based coverage criteria based on using input
domain partitions and their boundary values [40].
In some way, our approach has certain features in common with this paper
[37]. Authors used a set of variables based on disassembly attribute information
and application for procedure, such as the number and size of function argu-
ments and local variables, the number of assembler code lines, procedure frame
stack size and also cyclomatic complexity. In [41], author uses cyclomatic com-
plexity metric to perform in-memory fuzzing for more complex functions finding
to increase a probability of bugs detection. In [12] author mentions about oppor-
tunity to apply cyclomatic complexity as a metric of effectiveness evaluation of
the fuzzing technique. In [42] authors use basic blocks coverage to pick seed files
to maximize the total number of bugs found during a fuzz campaign. In addi-
tion to coverage, they also consider other attributes, such as speed of execution,
file size, etc. In [8] authors provide analysis of effective fuzzing strategies by us-
ing targeted taint driving fuzzing. Researchers used a different set of complexity
metrics, such as cyclomatic complexity, attack surface exposure or static analysis
for potentially vulnerable syscalls. The basic difference of our approach is that
we use specially adapted metrics that take into account semantics of executed
instructions as well as their interaction with input data.
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8 Discussion & Future Work
While implementing the metrics evaluation module, we limited ourselves to only
general-purpose x86 instructions. Thus, in future, the module should also sup-
port co-processor group of instructions as well as applications for x64 and ARM
architectures. Also we did not consider obfuscated executables since analysis of
obfuscated code is a separate direction of research.
Secondly, we plan to start using metrics to automatically improve the ef-
ficiency level of data generation. For example, it makes sense to perform in-
memory fuzzing for routines that have the highest level of complexity. It is also
possible to generate data using evolutionary algorithms, in which we could use
our set of efficiency assessment metrics as parameters for the data fitness func-
tion to improve data generation. Certainly, this approach needs to be confirmed
experimentally.
It should be noted that the limitation of our approach is the fact that to
reduce time costs, we need to have coverages array for each test case even before
fuzzing. However if we do not have such coverages, reducing of time costs is only
achieved at the second fuzzing campaign. This is justified when the system is
being integrated within existed secure development life cycle [25], when fuzzing is
performed on the regular basis after new patch or functionality has been released.
The system is also may be useful when existed set of test cases is applied for
similar type of applications. Such fuzzing strategy makes sense, demonstrates
positive results and is considered in this research [42].
9 Conclusion
In this article, we propose the novel approach to reduce time costs of fuzzing
campaign. We adapted 25 source code complexity assessment metrics to perform
analysis in binary code. Our experiments on the 104 vulnerable applications
have shown that Halstead B metric demonstrates maximum effectiveness to find
vulnerable routines in comparison with other metrics. We also proposed our own
metric based on Halsted B which shows more stable results. The experimental
results of effectiveness assessment have shown viability of our approach and
allowed to reduce time costs for fuzzing campaign by an average of 26-28% for
5 well-known fuzzing systems. We have implemented our approach as a set of
open-source tools that allows test cases prioritization, binary code complexity
evaluation as well as performs code coverage analysis and results visualization.
This article is based upon work supported by the Russian Fund of Funda-
mental Research, research project 14-07-31350. This work was also supported by
the research grant for young Russian scientists 14.Z56.15.6012-MK.
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Appendix 1: Adapted Metrics List
Metric Symbol Formula Description
Halstead metric
H.V H.V = N × log2n
Program volume
N = N1 +N2
N1 - the total number
of operators.
N2 - the total number
of operands.
n = n1 + n2
n1 - the total number of
unique operators.
n2 - the total number of
unique operands.
H.N∗ H.N
∗ = n1 ×
log2n1 + n2 × log2n2
Calculated program
length.
H.D H.D = n12 × N2n2 Program complexity.
H.B. H.B = E
2
3
3000
The number of delivered
bugs.
E = H.D ×H.B
Jilb’s
metric
Jilb cl = CLn
CL - the total number
of condition operators
(jmp, jxx, etc.).
N - the total number of
operators.
ABC
metric
ABC ABC =
√
A2 +B2 + C2
A - assignments count.
B - branches count.
C - calls count.
Cyclomatic
com-
plexity
CC CC = e− v + 2 e the number of edges;.v - the number of nodes
(basic blocks).
Modified
cycl.
com-
plex.
CC mod CC mod = e− v∗ + 2 v
∗ - the number of
nodes (switch cases are
considered as one node).
Pivovarskiy
metric
Pi Pi = CC mod+
∑n
i=0 pi
pi - nesting level of
predicate node i.
n - the total number of
predicate nodes.
Harrison
&
Magel
metric
H&M H&M =
∑n
i=0 ci
ci - node complexity.
n - the total number of
predicate nodes.
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Boundary
values
metric
Bound Bound = 1− (n−1)Sa
n - the total number of
nodes.
Sa =
∑n
i vi - routine
complexity
vi = ei − eo,
ei - the total number of
input edges.
eo - the total number of
output edges.
Span
metric
Span Span =
∑n
i=0 si
si - the number of
statements containing
the identifier.
n - the total number of
unique operators.
Henry
&
Cafura
metric
H&C
H&C = LOC ×
(fanin + fanout)
2
fanin - the total
number of input data
flows.
fanout - the total
number of output data
flows.
Card
&
Glass
metric
C&G C&G = S +D
S = fan2out,
D = v
(fanout+1)
v - the total number of
input and output
arguments.
Oviedo
metric
Oviedo Oviedo =
∑n
i=0DEF (Vj)
DEF (Vj) - a number of
occurrences of variable
Vj from R(i) set.
n - a set of variables
which is used in R(i).
R(i) - a set of local
variables defined in a
node i first time.
Chapin
metric
Chapin Chapin = P + 2M + 3C
P - the total number of
output variables.
M - the total number of
local variables.
C - the total number of
variables which are used
to manage CFG, such
as: cmp/test var and
then jxx.
Cocol
metric
Cocol Cocol = H.B + LOC + CC
